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On minimizing the risk of bias in randomized controlled trials in economics 
Alex Eble, Peter Boone, and Diana Elbourne 
 
Abstract 
   
Estimation of empirical relationships is prone to bias. Economists have carefully 
identified and addressed sources of bias in structural and quasi-experimental 
approaches, but the randomized control trial (RCT) has only recently begun to 
receive such scrutiny. In this paper, we argue that several lessons from medicine, 
derived from analysis of thousands of RCTs conducted over the past 60 years and 
establishing a clear link between certain practices and biased effect estimates, can 
be used to reduce the risk of bias in economics RCTs. We first identify the subset of 
these lessons applicable to RCTs in economics. We then use them to assess the risk 
of bias in estimates from economics RCTs published between 2001 and 2011. In 
comparison to medical studies, we find most economics studies do not report 
important details on study design necessary to assess risk of bias. Many report 
practices that suggest risk of bias, though this does not necessarily mean bias 
resulted. We conclude with suggestions on how to remedy these issues. 
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I. Introduction  
The practice of assigning different courses of action to different groups and comparing outcomes 
dates back thousands of years. In the Old Testament, King Nebuchadnezzar orders a group of his 
subjects to eat rich meat and drink wine while another group is made to adhere to vegetarianism 
in order to evaluate the merits of the two diets (1 Daniel 11-16, New International Version). 
Versions of this approach have since been used in countless other efforts to evaluate competing 
hypotheses, from 18th century studies of scurvy treatment to the A/B testing now common in 
technology firms.  
One particular version of this approach is the Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT). An 
RCT is usually a large-scale study, prospectively designed to test a small set of hypotheses by 
randomly assigning treatment(s) to participants. Medical scientists have implemented hundreds of 
thousands of RCTs since the mid-1940s to test hypotheses about treatment options and inform care 
decisions1. In the 1980s, several studies showed that RCTs in medical research yielded less biased 
treatment effect estimates than observational studies. The method has been adopted in several 
scientific fields, as well as by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and other government 
agencies, as the “gold standard” of empirical evidence (Vader 1998).  
Not all RCTs are created equal, however. Meta-analysis of thousands of medical RCTs has 
revealed several pitfalls that skew effect estimates and lead to erroneous conclusions (Jüni, 
Altman, and Egger 2001). Broader conclusions based on flawed studies have led to the use of 
drugs or procedures that bring no measurable benefit and, in some cases, even cause harm 
(Goldacre 2014). In the past two decades, medical researchers have synthesized this research 
linking certain design choices and biased results to develop standards for the design and reporting 
of RCTs. These standards are intended to reduce the risk of bias from the identified pitfalls. 
Adherence to them is now required for publication in most major medical journals (Plint et al. 
2006). 
Since the early 2000s, economists and other social scientists have increasingly used RCTs 
to evaluate hundreds of questions of both academic and policy interest (Parker 2010; Vivalt 2015). 
Within academia, the RCT is now widely considered a part of the economist’s empirical toolkit 
 
1
 There were 183,991 trial protocols registered in the US Government’s Clinical Trials database 
(www.clinicaltrials.gov) as of 11 February 2015. It is perhaps impossible to know how many trials have ever been 
conducted, as public registration of trial protocols was not common practice until the late 1990’s. 
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(Angrist and Pischke 2010); beyond academia, RCTs are often used to determine government 
policy as well as guide decisions in large international organizations (Parker 2010; Council of 
Economic Advisors 2014).  
In this paper, we argue that several lessons from the medical literature’s work linking 
pitfalls in trial design and reporting to bias in effect estimates can be used to improve the accuracy 
of estimates generated by RCTs in economics and other social sciences. The medical literature has 
spent decades scrutinizing these issues and its potential evidence base spans tens of thousands of 
already-conducted RCTs. The result of this work is a large body of research establishing a direct 
link from aspects of RCT design and reporting to biased effect estimates. While there are concerns 
in the medical literature that may be inappropriate for economics (e.g. strict protocols for blinding 
participants), several others are already central in empirical economic research: selection bias, non-
classical measurement error, attrition, attenuation, and selective reporting. Recent work in 
economics has highlighted how some of these issues could lead to biased effect estimates (Bruhn 
and McKenzie 2009; Deaton 2010; Brodeur et al. 2013), but there is no consensus among 
economists on how an RCT should be designed and reported to avoid these problems (Miguel et 
al. 2014).  
In the first part of the paper, we aim to help fill this gap. We draw upon the medical 
literature described above and the economics literature on RCTs and program evaluation to 
identify potential sources of bias in economics RCT estimates for which there is applicable 
evidence from medicine.  
Having made the case for the importance of these issues, the second part of the paper 
addresses our main research question: have economists running RCTs taken the necessary steps to 
avoid the relevant bias-inducing pitfalls identified by the medical literature? To answer this 
question, we attempt to collect the universe of RCTs in economics published between 2001 and 
2011 in a set of well-regarded journals. For each study, we then generate two assessments: first, 
whether the article provides the reader with enough information to evaluate the risk of bias in its 
estimates, and second, whether the study falls into any of the traps that have been associated with 
biased treatment effect estimates in medicine.  
We find that most studies in our sample do not report several pieces of important 
information necessary for the reader to determine the risk of bias in the presented results. It is 
important to note that even in medicine, bad reporting is often associated with poor practice, it 
may also be the case that bad reporting masks good practice and may not necessarily imply bad 
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methods (Soares et al. 2004). Several of the studies in our sample report quite well in most regards 
and, as economics lacks standards for reporting, it is not surprising that reporting of RCTs in 
economics is uneven. Still, this reporting gap begs for remedy: we argue that the burden of proof 
of the unbiasedness of a study’s results rests with the study’s authors.  
Among those studies that do report key design and analysis decisions, we find that many 
fall into precisely the same pitfalls that have biased medical RCTs in the past. Our findings raise 
concerns about the strength of the conclusions reached in several of the studies scrutinized.  
Together, the first and second parts of our study suggest that a core set of reporting and 
design practices drawn from the medical literature can be used to enhance the accuracy and 
precision of estimates generated by RCTs in economics. We conclude the paper with a series of 
suggestions on how to improve RCT design and reporting going forward.  
 
II. Identifying sources of bias in RCTs 
 
Empirical work in economics has made increasing use of the RCT to test theory and generate 
parameter estimates, yet efforts within economics to address the risk of bias in RCT estimates are 
limited in scope. Bruhn and McKenzie (2009) show that randomization procedures are often not 
reported in RCTs and, particularly for small studies, certain procedures are more likely than others 
to lead to chance imbalances between treatment groups that in some cases cannot be addressed by 
ex-post adjustments. Franco et al. (2014) find that significant results were 40 percentage points 
more likely to be published than null results among a set of 221 National Science Foundation-
funded studies in the social sciences spanning political science, economics and psychology. 
Brodeur et al. (2013) and Vivalt (2015) find some evidence of selective reporting in economics 
RCTs, though much less than in observational studies. Allcott (2015) shows that choice of 
implementing partner can bias RCT results relative to the expressed treatment effect of interest. 
Miguel et al. (2014) argue for reporting standards in social science RCTs and document recent 
efforts to meet this need. These studies are all quite recent and focus on individual aspects of the 
larger set of biases that threaten RCT results. They are necessarily limited by the relatively small 
number of RCTs that have been conducted in economics to date.  
In this section, we argue that several lessons from the long history of conducting and 
scrutinizing RCTs in medical research are applicable to RCTs in economics. Though RCTs have 
long been seen as the “gold standard” of evidence in medicine, a series of studies demonstrated a 
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negative relationship between methodological quality of medical RCTs and measured effect size. 
A landmark 1995 article linked problems in trial design to exaggeration of treatment effect 
estimates (Schulz et al. 1995). Its results have since been confirmed by several other meta-analyses 
linking certain design and reporting practices to biased estimates (Jüni, Altman, and Egger 2001; 
Gluud 2006; Dwan et al. 2008; Lesley Wood et al. 2008). These findings instigated a movement 
to improve and standardize methods of reporting and scrutinizing RCTs. 
In the late 1990s, two groups began working independently on a set of reporting standards 
for use in publication of randomized trials. Their combined efforts resulted in two main outputs. 
The first is the CONSORT Statement (henceforth “CONSORT”), a set of guidelines for 
publication of reports of randomized controlled trials. Adherence to these standards is now 
required by most editors of major medical journals (Schulz, Altman, and Moher 2010). The second 
is the Cochrane Collaboration, an international organization that facilitates systematic review and 
meta-analysis of published studies in order to draw overall conclusions about efficacy of various 
treatments. It publishes a handbook that guides authors on how to conduct these reviews. The 
handbook includes a section on how to evaluate the risk of bias in estimates generated by RCTs 
based on the body of literature linking certain trial design and reporting decisions to biased 
treatment effect estimates. The handbook is updated frequently and has been used in 8,600 
systematic reviews of trials2, which have together assessed the risk of bias in hundreds of thousands 
of scholarly articles (The Cochrane Collaboration 2010). This increased scrutiny during peer 
review and after publication has resulted in a reduction, over time, in the presence of the biases 
described above in medical RCT reports (Plint et al. 2006).  
The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) uses a similar set of standards to approve 
the sale of pharmaceuticals for public consumption. The progress of studies through each stage of 
this approval process illustrates the importance of such standards in screening false-positive 
results. For a drug to be approved by the FDA, it must pass three “phases” of trial. There is 
increasing scrutiny at each phase, such that phase two trials have a higher burden of proof than 
phase one but less than phase three, whose standards most resemble the CONSORT standards. 
Among trials that enter phase two, only 70 percent progress to phase three. Of those, 40 percent 
fail to show positive results in the two phase three trials usually necessary for FDA approval 
(Danzon, Nicholson, and Pereira 2005). 
 
2
 According to http://www.cochranelibrary.com/cochrane-database-of-systematic-reviews/index.html, accessed 11 February 2015. 
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Both CONSORT and Cochrane identify six types of problem associated with systematic 
bias in treatment effect estimates: selection, performance, detection, attrition, reporting and sample 
size biases (Jüni et al. 1999; Higgins, Green, and Cochrane Collaboration 2008; Moher et al. 2010). 
All of these have been treated in the broad economics literature. Selection, attrition, reporting and 
sample size issues have been dealt with extensively (Ashenfelter, Harmon, and Oosterbeek 1999; 
Wooldridge 2010). Much of performance and detection biases can be seen through the lens of the 
Hawthorne effect and non-classical measurement error, respectively, also well-known threats to 
economists (Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer 2007).  
The medical literature’s extensive evidence base, developed over six decades of running 
RCTs, is what allows it to make a novel contribution to the study of bias in economics RCTs. The 
CONSORT and Cochrane documents synthesize the results of thousands of studies and hundreds 
of meta-analyses to pinpoint the most likely candidates for RCT-specific bias and outline practices 
in avoiding them. These are the lessons we hope to use to improve RCT estimates in economics. 
Next, we discuss the sources of bias identified in decades of scrutiny of medical RCTs 
which we believe are applicable to economics RCTs. For each of the six biases (selection bias, 
attrition bias, performance bias, detection bias, reporting bias, sample size bias), we first explain 
the concern and its relation to economics. We then describe the reporting and design criteria that 
form the basis of the analysis we conduct in Section III.  
 
Sources of bias 
 
Selection bias  refers to the concern that systematic differences exist between treatment groups at 
the outset of the trial that could confound treatment effect estimation. There is a long literature in 
economics on selection bias in program evaluation, summarized by a recent Handbook of Labor 
Economics chapter (DiNardo and Lee 2011) and also discussed extensively in a Handbook of 
Development Economics chapter on running RCTs (Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer 2007). The 
medical literature contributes evidence linking a set of mechanisms through which the RCT-
specific process of enrolling participants and assigning them to treatment and control groups can 
artificially generate a difference between the two unrelated to the treatment effect of interest.  
Identified problems with selection bias arise from two main sources. The first is non-
random assignment to groups. Historically, participants in medical RCTs have often tried to tamper 
with or predict the randomization procedure. In other cases, researchers used a randomization 
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method that led to systematic baseline differences between the two groups. A review of several 
meta-analyses found that studies with problematic randomization procedures generated results that 
were 12 percent more likely to be positive than studies with unbiased randomization procedures 
(Gluud 2006).  
The relevant lesson is that it is important for the study to clearly state how randomization 
was done so that “the reader can assess the methods used to generate the random allocation 
sequence and the likelihood of bias in group assignment” (Schulz, Altman, and Moher 2010). The 
Cochrane Handbook echoes this concern:  
The starting point for an unbiased intervention study is the use of a mechanism that 
ensures that the same sorts of participants receive each intervention...If future 
assignments can be anticipated, either by predicting them or by knowing them, then 
selection bias can arise due to the selective enrolment and non-enrolment of 
participants into a study in the light of the upcoming intervention assignment. 
Economists and medical researchers have identified another potential pitfall in this 
category: that systematic differences arise between the stated population from which the sample is 
drawn and the participants who are ultimately randomized or analyzed (selection bias after entry 
or attrition bias). Manski (2013) discusses this problem in the context of drug trials run for FDA 
approval. If the participants of the trial are not representative of the population that the RCT attests 
to study, he argues, then the resultant treatment effect estimate will be a biased estimate of the 
population treatment effect3. A study that evaluates a smoking cessation drug using only light 
smokers as participants, for example, is likely to generate a biased estimate of the effect of the 
drug if it attests to study efficacy for the population of all smokers. Frijters, Kong, and Liu (2015) 
show evidence of this effect biasing the result of an RCT in rural China.  A common issue in non-
blinded cluster randomized controlled trials, which are frequent in the economics literature, is how 
to specify eligibility criteria for the population that will be analyzed.  For example, in an 
intervention providing materials to schools, there is a risk that some parents will switch their 
children to the better-equipped schools from control or non-study schools.  This can lead to biased 
estimates of the effect of the intervention.  In situations like this, the study design can include 
measures which will reduce or eliminate such bias (e.g. by enumerating children for analysis prior 
 
3
 Note that this is separate from concerns of generalizability. While generalizability deals with the applicability of a treatment effect estimate to 
a population different from that which generated the estimate, the concern we discuss here is about the internal validity of the treatment effect 
estimate for the stated population. 
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to randomization, and/or, agreeing restrictions on school transfers with school authorities), but 
special care needs to be taken. 
To assess adequacy of reporting and risk related to selection bias, we look for three pieces 
of information. The first is detail about how randomization was performed and, if this is 
information is present, whether it was done in a way to prevent the two problems associated with 
randomization discussed above: one, the risk of a bad rule which could itself generate bias, and 
two, the risk of people predicting or switching the group they are assigned to. We ask if the authors 
mention the method of randomization (e.g. by computer, stratified, public lottery) or any other 
information to suggest that a non-deterministic, tamper-proof rule was used to assign individuals 
or clusters to treatment and control groups.  
The second piece of information we look for is detail on who is screened for eligibility, 
who is eligible, who is enrolled in the trial and who is excluded. . This information is necessary to 
determine whether, as in Manski (2013), there exists a discrepancy between the putative population 
being studied and the population for whom the treatment effect is actually estimated. We also used 
this information to examine whether, due to the nature of the trial design, members of the 
population included in the primary analysis might have had an opportunity to enter the trial, or 
switch arms in the trial, post randomization.  Where issues could be present, we checked whether 
the authors attempted to address, or at least reported and/or discussed those issues.  Finally, we 
look to see whether the authors provide a table showing baseline covariates by treatment group 
which might suggest successful randomization. It is important to note that there even with secure 
randomization there may be imbalance by chance especially if a trial is small, but also that a 
potentially problematic allocation sequence could lead to issues of bias even if there was balance 
on observables, as the selection-on-unobservables literature points out (Manski 2013; Oster 2013). 
Attrition bias refers to a systematic loss of participants over the course of a trial, 
differentially between the trial arms, in a manner that potentially destroys the comparability of 
treatment groups obtained by randomization. Economists have dealt with attrition thoroughly in 
the empirical literature on the use of observational data (Heckman 1979; DiNardo and Lee 2011). 
In the context of an RCT, loss of participants stems from similar reasons: drop-out, missing data, 
refusal to respond, death, or any exclusion rules applied after randomization. The issue, as in 
Heckman (1979), is that the incidence of attrition may be partly driven by the treatment group one 
is in. One famous case from medicine is a study which initially showed a large positive impact of 
a drug to treat heart disease. The first publication excluded participants who died during the trial, 
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though mortality differed substantially between control and intervention groups. Subsequent 
analyses that included all participants according to randomization status, performed by a third 
party after the initial publication, failed to reject the null of no treatment effect (Temple and 
Pledger 1980).  
Attrition bias can also stem from decisions of whom to exclude from the final analysis. 
This relates to the decision whether to present analysis according to the “intent-to-treat” (ITT) 
principle or a “treatment-on-the-treated” (TOT) analysis (also termed per-protocol analysis), the 
difference between which is well understood in economics as well as in medicine (Duflo, 
Glennerster, and Kremer 2007). The relevant lesson from medicine is primarily about reporting – 
the reader should know whether the analysis presented is the ITT or TOT estimate to ensure that 
an unbiased account of the result of the trial is given.  
In our assessment of attrition bias, we look for a few key pieces of information. The first 
is a clear discussion of how participants flowed through the trial, from enrollment to the final 
analysis. The relevant lesson from medicine is that it is essential to know how many people drop 
out in each treatment group, their characteristics, and whether or not this drop-out destroys the 
balance obtained at baseline through randomization.  
The second concern is the application of the “intent-to-treat” principle. We look either for 
an explicit mention of the principle or, in the absence of its explicit mention, evidence of deviation 
from it in the main analyses. Specifically, if ITT is not mentioned, we check to see whether the 
number of participants randomized is equal to the number of participants included in the final 
analysis and, if there is a difference, whether it is explained. A study is judged to be reported 
inadequately only if it does not mention ITT, either adherence to it or explaining the reason for 
and ways in which the study deviated from it, and does not explain discrepancies between the 
number of participants randomized and the number included in the analysis of outcomes. It is 
considered to be at high risk of bias if there are substantial unexplained discrepancies between 
these two figures, or the exclusions described by the authors are likely to introduce bias between 
treatment and control groups not present at baseline. 
Performance bias is also known as the set of “Hawthorne” and “John Henry” or “research 
participation” effects. There is a documented tendency both in economics and medicine for 
participants to change their behavior or responses to questions because they are aware of being in 
a study and, specifically in a trial, are aware of their treatment allocation (Leonard and Masatu 
2006; McCambridge, J et al. 2014; Noseworthy et al. 1994; Zwane et al. 2011). This can skew 
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treatment effect estimates either upwards or downwards. In medicine, blinding of participants is 
often used to minimize this type of bias. In many economics studies and some medical studies, 
however, blinding is either ethically or logistically infeasible. For example, in the study of village-
level education interventions, blinding participants with a placebo intervention would be unethical 
(although analysis could be conducted blind to allocation). In some economics studies, blinding 
may even be contrary to the goals of the research.  
The relevant lesson from medicine is that extra scrutiny must be applied in two cases. The 
first case is when outcomes are subjective (e.g. self-reports of pain or personal opinions). A meta-
analysis of studies of acupuncture treatment on back pain showed that while acupuncture was 
superior to control interventions in unblinded studies, it could not be proven to be superior to sham-
interventions in blinded studies (Ernst and White 1998). Though all outcome assessments can be 
influenced by lack of blinding, there is greater risk of bias with more subjective outcomes. Lack 
of blinding was associated with a 30% exaggeration in treatment effect estimates in a meta-analysis 
of studies with subjective outcomes (L. Wood et al. 2008). 
The second case is when patients are likely to change their behavior given their knowledge 
of which group they are assigned to. Knowledge of allocation status has been known to induce 
some control group participants to seek extra care, which, if effective, would introduce a 
systematic downward bias on treatment effect estimates. In economics this is often the stated 
purpose of the research, as in Akresh et al. (2013). In studies attempting to evaluate the effect a 
specific treatment, e.g. the effect of a medicine on an illness, however, unaccounted-for differential 
care seeking by treatment group could bias effect estimates.  
In our assessment, we look for information on these two concerns when blinding 
participants to which treatment group they are in is impossible. The first concern is whether the 
outcomes are subjective enough to be vulnerable to the Hawthorne Effect. The second is whether 
individuals are aware of the treatment under study and their assignment to treatment or control. If 
so, we ask whether this might induce them to act in a way that would offset or intensify the impact 
of the treatment the researchers are intending to measure. We flag this as a concern only when 
there is likely offsetting/intensifying behavior, such as differential care seeking, not accounted for 
in the description of the study. 
Detection bias (also called assessment bias) is concerned with data collectors unduly 
influencing either the behavior of participants or the data collected in a way that generates artificial 
differences between treatment groups. This is likely to work through one of two channels. The first 
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channel is similar to the placebo effect. CONSORT notes how data collectors’ knowledge of the 
treatment status of each participant may lead them to unconsciously filter the data they collect: 
“unblinded data collectors may differentially assess outcomes (such as frequency or timing), repeat 
measurements of abnormal findings, or provide encouragement during performance testing. 
Unblinded outcome adjudicators may differentially assess subjective outcomes” (Moher, Schulz, 
and Altman 2001). In a trial in which ill patients performed a walking test with and without 
encouragement from the data collector, encouragement alone was shown to improve time and 
distance walked by around 15 percent (Guyatt et al. 1984) and similar impacts of detection bias 
have been found in other medical RCTs (Noseworthy et al. 1994). The second channel is a simple 
case of incentive alignment. If data collectors are employed by the organization whose intervention 
is being evaluated in an RCT, there is a clear conflict of interest that raises concerns about the 
accuracy of the data collected.  
In our assessment, we first look to see whether data collectors are blinded to the treatment 
status of participants. If the data collectors are not blinded, we then look to see whether the data 
collectors are contractually related or otherwise linked to the organization administering the 
treatment in a way which might induce them to bias the data they collect. We also ask whether 
there is any other reason to suspect data collection might differ between the two arms in a 
substantive way, such as data collected at different scheduled times or by different individuals for 
treatment and control groups. 
Reporting bias points to the fact that it is exceedingly difficult, in any reading of empirical 
analysis, to know whether authors are presenting the entirety of the results of the study or only that 
subset of outcomes which is deemed interesting or sympathetic to the case they are trying to make. 
Recent meta-analysis has shown evidence of this among studies in economics (Brodeur et al. 2013) 
and in medicine, the latter of which finds that “statistically significant outcomes had a higher odds 
of being fully reported compared to non-significant outcomes (range of odds ratios: 2.2 to 4.7)” 
(Dwan et al. 2008). A meta-analysis of medical studies on anthelminth therapy and treatment for 
incontinence found that “more outcomes had been measured than were reported.” This study 
calculated that with a change in the assumptions about which outcomes the largest study chose to 
report, “the conclusions could easily be reversed” (Hutton and Williamson 2000).  
To combat this problem, many medical journals require that a protocol and statistical 
analysis plan be registered with a third-party database before the study begins. These documents 
record the plan for conduct of the trial, the intended sample size, and the analyses that the 
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researchers plan to undertake at the end. This is called a “pre-analysis plan” in economics. While 
there are tools in economics which can help mitigate some types of the multiple comparison 
problem (Kling, Liebman, and Katz 2007), a recent study in economics demonstrates how separate 
and contradictory erroneous conclusions could have been drawn from a randomized experiment in 
Sierra Leone in the absence of a pre-analysis plan (Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel 2012). We 
acknowledge that pre-analysis plans involve important tradeoffs in the context of economics 
research (Olken 2015), but argue that, at the very least, the decision of whether or not to have one 
should be documented in the final publication so that the readers can judge for themselves about 
the study-specific risk of bias this entails.  
Furthermore, to prevent authors from running analyses ad infinitum and unduly weighting 
only those which are statistically significant, medical journals require that both the protocol and 
subsequent article report which outcome is “primary” and thus given highest credence. For non-
primary outcomes, additional labels of “secondary” (pre-planned, but not the primary analysis) 
and “exploratory” (conceived of after the data was collected and examined) are assigned to the 
remaining presented results. Though exploratory analyses are seen as informative, they are given 
less weight than pre-specified analyses, as there is a wealth of evidence of false-positive results 
from ad hoc analyses conducted with the benefit of being able to look at the data first (Oxman and 
Guyatt 1992; Yusuf et al. 1991; Assmann et al. 2000; Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel 2012).  
The sophisticated statistical and econometric tools often employed in robustness checks 
and sensitivity analysis in economics provide some protection against this risk, and recent work in 
economics shows that reporting bias may be less of a concern in RCTs than observational studies 
(Brodeur et al. 2013). Vivalt (2015) also tests for reporting bias in a large set of trials and impact 
evaluations, finding little evidence of reporting bias in published RCTs.  
These studies, however, do not provide enough evidence to evaluate the broader risk of 
reporting bias in RCTs in economics. Brodeur et al. (2013) limit their analysis of experiments to 
only 37 articles from three top journals, two thirds of which are non-randomized laboratory 
experiments, not RCTs. The small sample size and journal spectrum of this exercise limit its 
generalizability. Vivalt (2015) scrutinizes a larger number of studies than is covered in our paper 
but focuses on generalizing from impact evaluations in development, which is a substantially 
different aim than that of our analysis. Commenting on her results related to reporting bias, she 
also notes that while “these figures look much better than the typical ones in the literature,” her 
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choice of which estimates to use in each eligible paper was “designed…partially to minimize bias, 
which could help explain the difference.”  
We look for a series of indicators to inform our assessment of the risk of reporting bias. 
The first is presence of a pre-registered protocol and/or analysis plan. We realize this is unlikely 
for many economics studies, particularly those published in our time frame; however the goal of 
our analysis is to document what is reported in published RCTs in economics and to assess the risk 
of bias in these studies. The medical literature clearly links over-weighting post hoc outcomes to 
risk of bias (Assmann et al. 2000). The potential for this bias is also documented in the economics 
literature (Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel 2012). The second piece of information we look for is 
specification of a “primary” analysis or outcome (in medicine, a “primary endpoint”, which is 
usually one single measure, although study designs can incorporate more than one primary 
endpoint and clearly specify how they will address multiple testing issues). We recognize this is 
similarly strict, however we point again to the unambiguous link between the lack of reporting 
constraints and the likelihood of finding significant results in the medical literature.  
 
Finally, under reporting bias, we examine the interpretation of results. Here we look for a 
clear and objective description of the study which  
 
 Summarizes the findings of the study 
 Considers alternative mechanisms and explanations of the results 
 Offers a comparison with relevant findings from other studies and a brief summary of the 
implications of the study in the context of other outcomes and evidence, evidence which is 
not limited to evidence that supports the results of the current trial 
 Offers some limitations of the present study 
 Exercises special care when evaluating multiple comparisons 
 
These five issues, taken directly from CONSORT, set a fairly low bar for what should be reported 
in the interpretation of a study. We include them in our assessment to determine whether the study 
expresses irrational exuberance about its results, another form of reporting bias identified in the 
medical and economics literatures (Deaton 2010), perhaps the result of labeling the RCT as the 
“gold standard” of evidence.  
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Sample size bias is better known among economists as the twin concerns of attenuation and undue 
bias from outliers. An insufficiently large sample size does not in itself lead to biased estimates of 
the treatment effect, but it can lead to imprecise estimation and, if not properly interpreted, 
incorrect conclusions (Wooldridge 2010).  Sample size calculations should be included in any pre-
analysis plan in order to understand the effect size the study is capable of measuring.   CONSORT 
describes the risk of small sample sizes: 
Reports of studies with small samples frequently include the erroneous conclusion that 
the intervention groups do not differ, when in fact too few patients were studied to 
make such a claim. Reviews of published trials have consistently found that a high 
proportion of trials have low power to detect clinically meaningful treatment effects. 
In reality, small but clinically meaningful true differences are much more likely than 
large differences to exist, but large trials are required to detect them. 
Guyatt and Mills and Elbourne (2008) debated the value of small trials in the medical literature, 
and a recent study of the issue also finds that trials with inadequate power have a high false-
negative error rate and are implicated as a source of publication bias (Dwan et al. 2008).  
The second concern is that without enough observations, draws from the extreme right or 
left tail are unduly weighted and could lead to exaggerated results. Two other studies in medicine 
link small sample sizes to overstating effect size because of the heightened influence of outliers 
(Moore, Gavaghan, et al. 1998; Moore, Tramèr, et al. 1998). To guard against these problems, both 
CONSORT and Cochrane expect researchers to conduct sample size calculations before collecting 
any data and report these calculations in trial publications4.  
In our assessment, we look for a description of the sample size calculation used to design 
the study in the paper, in a publicly available pre-study registration, or in an online appendix. It is 
important to note that the reader cannot always infer the necessary sample size from the reported 
standard errors on an RCT’s treatment estimates, as these too are sample moments which are more 
subject to bias the smaller the sample size is. The inclusion of a prior sample size calculation tells 
the reader what the trial was designed to measure and allows the reader to see whether there were 
enough observations collected to test the original hypothesis. It also links the main outcomes 
 
4
 One reader pointed out that our bias assessment tool includes many items (such as sample size calculations) which could be considered 
“common sense” to include in an RCT report. This emphasizes our points that 1) the absence of much of the information we are looking for is 
somewhat surprising, and 2) the shortcomings in reporting we identify prevent the reader from determining the risk of bias in many RCTs in 
economics.  
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presented to the original design of the trial, which helps guard against specification searching and 
misrepresentation of ad-hoc analysis. 
III. Assessing reporting and the risk of bias in RCTs in economics 
Using the issues identified in the previous section, we next attempt to answer two research 
questions. First, are the recent reports of RCTs in economics providing readers with sufficient 
information to assess the risk of bias in the study? Second, among these studies, what is the risk 
of each of the six types of bias, given the empirical evidence linking certain design and reporting 
choices and exaggerated treatment effect estimates in the medical literature?  
 
Identifying relevant concerns 
We first read the literature from economics and medicine on sources of bias in RCT estimates and 
program evaluation to identify the subset of concerns from the medical literature most applicable 
to economics RCTs. These concerns are described in the previous section. We then developed a 
reporting and bias assessment tool to determine, for each study, what is reported and the risk of 
bias for each identified concern5. Next, we attempted to collect all economics articles reporting 
RCTs published between 2001 and 2011 in a set of 52 major peer reviewed journals. This 
collection process is described in further detail below. To evaluate the validity of our assessment 
tool and to provide a benchmark for our assessments of articles in economics, we randomly 
selected an equal number of articles from three top peer-reviewed journals in medicine. Finally, 
we applied our assessment tool to both sets of articles.  
 The assessment tool was designed to facilitate and collect assessments of adequacy of 
reporting and risk of bias in terms of the six biases discussed above. Following the concerns 
outlined earlier, there are 12 specific issues we assess spread across the six biases6 with leading 
questions to aid assessment. For example: “does the paper give the number of participants in each 
group included in the analysis, and whether this analysis is according to the “Intention to Treat” 
principle? If not, is there evidence that the principle was followed?”  
The task of the assessor is to make two assessments for each issue: first, does the paper 
report adequately on the matter, providing the reader with enough information to assess the risk of 
 
5
 The assessment tool is given in the Web Appendix. 
6
 We began with 13 and removed one as it was excessively stringent. Details are given in the Web Appendix Where is this? 
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bias, and second, is the paper at low risk of bias from the relevant threat? The assessor circles 
either a yes or a no for each question and, if possible, provides a page number and/or explanation 
in the comment and quote boxes to the right of the question to justify each assessment. We decided 
on the following rule for assessment of risk of bias: if a paper did not report adequately on the 
issue, it could not be assessed as having a low risk of bias. This decision reflects our judgment, 
mentioned earlier, that the burden of proof of the unbiasedness of a study’s results rests with the 
author. The landmark meta-analysis assessing study quality in medicine uses a similar rule (Schulz 
et al. 1995). We present results on reporting and risk of bias for each individual issue as well as 
aggregated to the bias level under a simple rule – if a study is inadequately reported or not at low 
risk of bias for one issue, it is inadequately reported or not at low risk of bias for the relevant bias. 
We do not create an overall study-level assessment 7 , as expectations on both the sign and 
magnitude of bias vary across issues.  
We selected studies for assessment using the following process: 
1) We searched EconLit for journal articles published between 2000 and 2009 
that contained either the word randomized or randomization (or their 
alternative UK spellings) in the title or abstract. A search conducted on July 
6th, 2010 generated 527 results. This was amended on September 5th, 2012, to 
expand the time range to include papers from 2010 and 2011. The amendment 
yielded 235 additional results8. 
2) Within these results, we further limited eligibility by two criteria:  
a. We included only articles reporting results of prospectively randomized 
studies. As we are evaluating study design, it would be inappropriate to 
include studies not designed as trials (e.g. natural experiments).  
b. To limit heterogeneity of study quality, we further restricted eligibility to 
articles published in the top 50 journals as rated by journal impact within 
economics, taken from a Boston Fed working paper which ranks economics 
journals (Kodrzycki and Yu 2006). In the 2012 search amendment, we added 
papers from the American Economic Journal: Applied Economics and the 
 
7
 Several meta-analyses of the risk of bias in medicine follow this practice as well (Spiegelhalter and Best 2003). 
8
 We recognize that this is not the universe of published RCTs but believe it is a good approximation. Scanning the abstracts of all articles in 
these journals published over the period would have been prohibitively time-consuming. Including the word “experiment” in the search terms raises 
the number of initial results well into the thousands.  
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American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, from the journals’ inception 
in 2009 onward, in light of their prestige and the volume of RCT reports they 
publish. 
In total, this yielded 54 articles published between 2001 and 2011.  
We then conducted a search to collect studies reporting RCTs in three top peer-reviewed 
medical journals for assessment. This served two purposes – one, to calibrate our assessment tool9, 
and two, to provide a benchmark for how enforced standards might improve reporting. Articles in 
medicine were drawn from the top three medical journals according to impact factor in general 
and internal medicine on July 6th, 2010 from Thompson Journal and Citation Reports (Thompson 
Reuters 2010). These were The Lancet, The Journal of the American Medical Association, and The 
New England Journal of Medicine. This restriction was made for ease of processing, as it reduced 
the number of eligible studies in each year from several thousand to approximately 350, and to 
ensure we were evaluating the “gold standard” in medicine as described above. The selection 
process for medical articles was as follows: 
1) We searched Pubmed (a database similar to Econlit indexing articles in 
medical journals) for all articles reporting clinical trials in the three journals 
in years for which there was also an eligible economics article (all years in 
our range save 2002).  
2) From this list, we then randomly selected as many articles in a given year as 
there were eligible articles in economics from that year. Among studies 
published in a given year, selection was performed by assigning each article 
a random number between 0 and 1 using a random number generator. We 
sorted the articles by their randomly assigned number and, beginning with the 
lowest random numbers, we then selected the required number of articles.  
3) We excluded phase one and phase two trials in medicine as their methods, 
goals and sample size considerations are significantly different from phase 
three trials, which, similar to the economics trials we are concerned with, are 
more often used to inform policy.  
 
9
 Given that the medical trials we collected were published in journals that required adherence to the standards in the CONSORT Statement, if 
we were to find most medical trials were at high risk of many biases (low risk of all biases), we would be concerned that the instrument was too 
strict (lenient). 
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The final list of both sets of papers is given in the Appendix. If a trial generated more than one 
eligible publication, the article published earliest was selected and the remaining associated articles 
were used to provide additional information for assessment of the main article.  
The assessment tool was first piloted by all three authors and Miranda Mugford. Once it 
was finalized, two authors (AE/PB) first read each article and assessed the adequacy of reporting 
and risk of bias using the assessment tool individually. For each article, we then discussed our 
assessments. Any disagreements were resolved through deliberation, the result of which is the final 
assessment of each study. We adopted this method of individual assessment followed by 
deliberation for two reasons. First, the exercise was a novel one and we expected our assessments 
to improve through discussion. Second, we followed the example of several meta-analyses in the 
medical literature, which find that while independent assessment potentially provides better 
internal validity of the tool, the rate of agreement between assessors in such processes is often low 
(Clark et al. 1999). In practice, our mean rate of agreement on an issue was greater than 85 percent.  
 
Results 
For four of the six biases in our assessment tool, less than 30 percent of the articles collected are 
assessed as reporting adequately, and for no type of bias are more than three quarters of the 
economics articles assessed as reporting adequately. Among the subset of articles in which 
reporting is assessed as adequate, there are many cases in which there is high risk of bias, that is, 
in which the authors report having made trial design decisions which are known to have biased 
estimates in medicine. In the exercise used to calibrate our instrument, we found that medical 
RCTs, published in journals which require these standards be followed, have substantially better 
reporting and lower risk of bias, though for none of our bias categories do 100 percent of the 
articles report adequately or have low risk of bias.  
These overall performance ratings mask substantial heterogeneity on the different issues 
within the six biases. While in some issues (reporting and sample size) few papers are assessed as 
having low risk of bias, in others (performance and detection) most relevant issues are usually 
addressed. Indeed, in some cases the papers published in economics that we examine fare no 
differently than those we examine which are published in the top three medical journals.  
Below, we show summary statistics of our assessments at the issue and bias-level, and 
describe our assessments for each issue in detail. Figure 1 shows simple bar charts with 95 percent 
confidence intervals documenting performance of economics articles and medical articles in terms 
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of adequacy of reporting and risk of bias for each of the six biases. Similar charts breaking down 
the assessments of each bias by issue are given in Appendix 3. Table 1 provides the number of 
papers assessed as adequately reporting and at low risk of bias at the issue and bias levels with a 
chi-square test for equality of proportions between the assessments for economics and medicine.  
[ Insert Table 1 Here] 
[ Insert Figure 1 Here] 
 
Only 12 of the 54 eligible economics articles (22%) passed all of the reporting criteria for 
selection bias, while 40 of the 54 eligible medical articles did so. Performance varied across the 
three issues in this bias. Thirty-four of the 54 economics papers reported adequately on their 
randomization procedure, but five of these used clearly deterministic methods to assign treatment. 
An alphabetic rule was used in one case and sorting by date of employment commencement was 
used in another. Less than half of the economics studies provided adequate information about the 
flow of potential participants in the trial. In the majority of economics articles, information on the 
number of participants at three important stages - screening for eligibility and exclusion from the 
study before and after eligibility was assessed - was not given, raising concerns about potential 
undocumented discrepancies between the declared population of interest and the sample studied 
(Manski 2013; Frijters, Kong, and Liu 2015). All but six of the 54 economics papers provided a 
table showing whether there was balance on observables at the time of randomization, suggesting 
that randomization was usually successful. Two papers that gave this information showed evidence 
suggesting that the randomization did not achieve the desired balance.  
The largest issue related to attrition bias was failure to report how many participants 
progressed through the trial from enrolment to inclusion in the final analysis. More than two thirds 
of the economics RCTs we assessed had striking inconsistencies between the number of 
participants they enrolled and the number of observations included in the final analyses which 
were not discussed in the body of the paper or in the appendixes. The number of observations 
varied among final analyses in many of these papers, in some cases by up to 30 percent, often with 
no explanation for the difference. As reported in Table 1, the papers with flow of participants data 
clearly outlined avoided these problems. We suspect the discipline of monitoring and reporting the 
flow of participant data encourages trial designers to limit attrition, as well as helping ensure that 
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authors explain cases of substantial attrition.  Reporting of adherence to or deviation from the 
intent-to-treat principle was adequate in more than half of the studies we assessed. Two of these 
reported deliberate exclusions that suggested risk of bias.  
Thirty-eight of the 54 economics papers reported adequately in terms of performance bias 
and only one of these reported a design decision which raised concerns about risk of bias. In this 
case, there was possibility of unaccounted-for alternative care-seeking as a result of knowledge of 
treatment status which could have biased the effect the authors were trying to measure. In the 
sixteen studies assessed as not reporting adequately, the most common concern was a subjective 
outcome assessed without blinding and without mention of the possibility of bias from the 
Hawthorne Effect. These circumstances are linked clearly in medicine to exaggerated treatment 
effects (Lesley Wood et al. 2008). Overall, assessment of reporting and risk of performance bias 
in economics articles was not statistically distinguishable from our assessment of medical articles. 
Thirty-seven of the 54 studies reported adequately on the issues surrounding detection bias. 
Two of these 37 documented problematic practices. In both cases, the authors explicitly mentioned 
using data collectors who were employed by the same organization which administered the 
intervention. Of the seventeen not assessed as reporting adequately, most neglected to say who 
collected the data, leaving doubt as to whether a similar conflict of interest could have biased the 
results.  
No economics paper was assessed as adequately reporting in terms of reporting bias, and 
therefore none could be assessed as having low risk of bias in this category. This assessment attests 
to the absence of either a pre-analysis plan or registration of a study protocol prior to 
implementation of the trial. No economics paper in our sample mentioned either, though we are 
aware that writing a protocol and registering it is increasingly common in economics. Economics 
RCT protocol registries have been established by both the American Economic Association and J-
PAL, among others.  
The other relevant concern is the specification of a primary outcome and the differentiation 
between planned and ad-hoc secondary analyses. We enthusiastically support, and ourselves 
practice, conducting analyses conceived after a trial finishes. We agree with the medical literature, 
however, that they should be described as such to allow the reader to weight the different types of 
evidence provided in the paper. The final issue in our assessment of reporting bias in economics 
was interpretation of results. Nearly half of the economics papers did not mention whether there 
were any limitations in their methods nor did they condition their interpretation of the strength of 
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their results in light of the many comparisons that they presented. Interestingly, the medical papers 
in our sample also fared rather poorly in this final regard.  
Only two economics papers attested to perform a prior sample size calculation. We are 
almost certain that some others did (Banerjee et al. 2007; Parker 2010), but as none were reported, 
overall the economics literature did not report adequately on this bias. We decided against 
soliciting such information from authors in light of evidence that doing so was likely to lead to 
biased responses (Haahr and Hróbjartsson 2006) and our rule tying inadequacy of reporting to risk 
of bias was applied. 
 We calculated subgroup-specific bias assessments for a few categories of interest for both 
economics and medical RCTs. These results are shown in Figures 2-4. We found that more recent 
studies in economics (i.e. from the 2010-2011 amendment to our initial search) performed 
similarly to their earlier-published counterparts (Figure 2), though we suspect this is improving 
with the establishment of trial registries and the increased attention these issues have received in 
the past few years. In medicine, we observe better reporting and lower risk of the six biases in the 
more recently published group, likely a consequence of the increasing use of CONSORT 
guidelines by journal editors.  
[ Insert Figures 2-3 Here] 
Papers reporting the results of economics RCTs taking place in developing countries 
(Figure 3) had more issues with performance, detection, and attrition bias than papers reporting 
the results of trials taking place in the US, Canada, and Europe. Among economics studies taking 
place in the developing world, data collectors were more often related to the intervention being 
applied, outcomes were more often subjective, and the number of observations was less stable 
among the final analyses within a paper. We find no such differences between those medical RCTs 
run in developed countries compared to those run in developing countries. 
[ Insert Figure 4 Here] 
The performance of papers published in the “top five” journals (Econometrica, the 
American Economic Review, the Journal of Political Economy, the Quarterly Journal of 
Economics and the Review of Economic Studies) was similar to performance of papers in the other 
47 economics journals we included for all six of the biases (Figure 4). 
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IV. Ways Forward 
We have presented evidence that a large proportion of RCTs in economics published between 2001 
and 2011 did not report many pieces of information necessary for the reader to assess the risk of 
bias in the evidence provided. Among those studies that do report this information, we found that 
several made many of the same design choices that have been shown to lead to biased results in 
medical RCTs. As a result, we conclude that these trials are at unnecessarily high risk of presenting 
exaggerated treatment effect estimates.  
The economics literature has begun to address several of these issues. A series of “toolkits” 
on how to conduct RCTs have been put forth (Duflo, Glennerster, and Kremer 2007; Glennerster 
and Takavarasha 2013) and groups such as the Berkeley Initiative for Transparency in the Social 
Sciences conduct annual meetings which focus heavily on improving methods and transparency 
in social science research.  
Our paper contributes novel evidence to this discussion. We make the case that a series of 
lessons from the medical literature is applicable to economics RCTs and use them to scrutinize 
RCTs published in economics journals between 2001 and 2011. We show that there is ample room 
for these lessons to be used to improve both the reporting and design of RCTs in economics. 
To ensure that the evidence from RCTs published in the economics literature is as reliable 
as possible, we echo calls elsewhere (Miguel et al. 2014) to establish a system of reporting 
standards for RCTs in economics, similar to the CONSORT guidelines widely accepted in the 
medical literature. The contents of such a system would have to come from a consensus among 
economists on what constitutes good practice as well as which data are necessary to assess risk of 
bias. This should draw on the recent toolkits mentioned above.  
As Miguel et al. (2014) note, some standards for trials in economics will necessarily differ 
from those in medicine. The medical standards are imperfect by their own admission and, as 
discussed earlier, the goals of some economics research are in direct conflict with certain 
CONSORT strictures. A good starting point for the departure from medical reporting standards is 
the admissibility of and weight placed on non-pre-specified outcomes, given the sophisticated 
statistical and econometric tools often employed in robustness checks and sensitivity analysis.  
 However, in many areas the “good reporting” requirements for economics trials and 
medical trials will be similar.  The CONSORT guidelines included in our bias assessment tool 
were suitable for all of the economics studies we examined in this paper.  They address most 
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situations (multiple endpoints, non-blinded, cluster randomization) typically found in economics 
trials which are less common in medical trials (Campbell et. al. 2012).  In cases where the 
guidelines were implemented by authors, such as including “Flow of participant” diagrams, we 
noted a substantial lowering of specific risk of bias in economics papers.     
We strongly suggest that, at the very least, the following issues from CONSORT be part 
of any set of guidelines for RCT design and reporting: a CONSORT-style diagram of flow of 
participants; requiring either registration of protocols/pre-analysis plans prior to randomization or 
a discussion of why this was decided against; requiring pre-specification of a primary outcome 
accompanied by a link to the relevant sample size calculation conducted prior to trial entry; and, 
in cases where appropriate, insistence on the intent-to-treat principle for the primary analysis.  
There are a few productive avenues of inquiry we leave to future research. Monte-Carlo 
simulation of the impacts of different types of bias using existing data from economics RCTs and 
censuses could illustrate the likely magnitude of the biases outlined here. Standards on reporting 
related to generalizability, discussed elsewhere (Vivalt 2015; Allcott 2015), are arguably of similar 
importance and there is a rich literature on how to assess this in reports of RCTs (Rothwell 2006). 
Lastly, we would like to mention that a major weakness of our study is the number of 
assessors we used. Our assessment task was a long and tedious one and almost certainly not 
without some human error. An increase in the number of evaluators for each paper would almost 
certainly improve the reliability of our results. Nonetheless, our independent initial assessment by 
multiple individuals follows best practice in systematic review and the high level of agreement in 
our independent assessments suggests a high degree of objectivity. The application of our 
assessment tool to ongoing research would shed additional light on how recent efforts to improve 
the quality of economics RCTs have fared. 
V. Conclusion 
In this study, we make two main contributions. First, we identify a series of lessons from the 
medical literature on sources of bias in RCT estimates that are applicable to economics RCTs. 
Second, we use these lessons to assess the adequacy of reporting and risk of six major biases in 
economics RCTs published in 52 top economics journals between 2001 and 2011. We find that 
these articles often do not provide the reader with essential information on design and reporting 
decisions related to identified sources of bias. We conclude that RCTs in economics are at a far 
higher risk of reporting exaggerated treatment effects than necessary given what we know from 
   
 
24 
 
medicine about how to minimize bias in RCTs. We finished by suggesting, as have others, that 
one means by which to minimize this risk would be for economists to develop and adopt a set of 
reporting guidelines to ensure clarity and precision in the reports of RCTs. We offered several 
suggestions for the content of such standards. 
Going forward, we hope that our study will contribute to the establishment and acceptance 
of a set of standards for designing and reporting RCTs. Such standards would serve two purposes. 
First, they would improve the quality of RCTs going forward. Second, they would serve as a tool 
to help scholars and policymakers in assessing the risk of bias in estimates from existing studies. 
The medical example has shown that such repeated scrutiny is likely to increase efforts by 
researchers themselves to avoid these pitfalls in the design, execution, and analysis of their trials. 
We strongly believe that these efforts would lead to higher quality evidence and, we hope, improve 
the usefulness of RCTs in learning and policy decisions.   
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Figure 1. Assessment results overall, by field 
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Figure 2. Assessment results separated by date of publication and field 
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Figure 3. Assessment results from developing and developed countries, by field 
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Figure 4. Assessment results by ranking of journal, economics only 
 
 
  
 
Table 1—Assessment results by issue/bias and field 
  Economics (n = 54) Medicine (n = 54) P-value of Chi-square test  
Bias Issue Number 
reporting 
adequately 
Number at 
low risk of 
bias 
Number 
reporting 
adequately 
Number at 
low risk of 
bias 
Reporting Risk of bias 
Selection Randomization 34 29 52 52 <.001 <.001 
Selection Flow of participants 20 20 40 40 <.001 <.001 
Selection Baseline demographics 48 46 53 52 .051 .046 
Attrition Flow of participants 17 17 51 51 <.001 <.001 
Attrition Intent-to-treat 35 33 47 47 .007 .002 
Performance Data collection 43 43 51 51 .022 .022 
Performance Participant behavior 45 44 42 42 .466 .633 
Detection - 37 35 53 51 <.001 <.001 
Reporting Protocol/analysis plan 0 0 50 50 <.001 <.001 
Reporting Outcomes  0 0 49 49 <.001 <.001 
Reporting Interpretation of results 12 12 19 19 <.001 <.001 
Sample size - 34 34 51 51 <.001 <.001 
        
Aggregated to        
bias level        
Selection  9 12 39 40 <.001 <.001 
Attrition  15 16 46 46 <.001 <.001 
Performance  38 38 41 41 .515 .515 
Detection  37 35 53 51 <.001 <.001 
Reporting  0 0 17 17 <.001 <.001 
Sample size  1 1 52 52 <.001 <.001 
        
        
 
